Entry and Survival: The Case of Foreign Banks in Norway

Introduction
Banks have been engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) for over 150 years. In doing so, they have had to deal with the problems of the liability of foreigness, generally without being able to depend on proprietary administrative or physical technology. Foreign direct investment in banking therefore provides many experiments in entry and survival in a comparable industry across countries and institutional environments.
Within banking, the Norwegian case has a number of useful characteristics.
First, there is a clear and recent starting point for the entry of foreign banks.
Second, there is an interesting mix of entrants and abstainers, and entry strategies. Third, enough time has elapsed that one can start to observe failures and survivors.
In Section 2 I review the history of the Norwegian banking system and especially policies towards foreign banks. In brief, Norway has a long history of closure to foreign banks.
In Section 3 I examine which foreign banks did or did not enter Norway when the government liberalized entry. The banks that entered had divergent firm-specific resources and followed divergent strategies. I pay particular attention to issues of the foreign banks' prior experience in Norway itself and the foreign banks' advantages vis-à-vis domestic banks.
In Section 4 I investigate the correlates of survival and exit among the foreign bank entrants. Survival factors include prior experience in Norway, the size of the entrant at start-up, and the size of the parent. Lastly, Section 6 is a summary and conclusion.
The Norwegian banking environment i
In 1971 and again in 1973 several foreign banks sought the Ministry of Finance's permission to enter Norway. In 1973 the Ministry ruled that representative offices did not come under the banking law and hence foreign banks did not require permission. In 1974, the Government formally rejected applications from foreign banks to establish branches or subsidiaries (Flatraaker 1990) . The prohibition lasted until 1985. Reluctant to let its own banks go abroad, Norway did not have to offer reciprocity. Norway thus stands in some contrast to the situation in Japan and Korea (Ursacki and Vertinsky 1992) . The attractiveness of the Japanese markets to foreign institutions enabled Japan to use a strict definition of reciprocity; Japan could both reduce entry from other countries unwilling to ease their conditions, and perhaps lever open entry into foreign markets for its own institutions. Korea had less leverage.
i This section draws on Jacobsen and Tschoegl (1995) .
Norway was in no hurry to liberalize entry. Norwegian government policy after WW II had created a situation that enhanced the attractiveness of the Norwegian market to foreign banks and hence made closure to foreign banks even more necessary. The Norwegian government targeted unemployment and interest rates and Norway's credit market became one of the most regulated in Europe. The restrictions on interest rates applied only to the banks and insurance companies, further distorting competition. Mortgage banks, finance companies, and so forth could charge market rates. Furthermore, law and regulation forced the banks to keep 25% of borrowed money as liquid reserves and 40% of their capital in government bonds.
Consequently Norwegian banks found it difficult to compete with foreign banks. Instead, foreign banks operating from financial centers such as London became particularly noteworthy suppliers of credit to Norwegian firms both abroad and in Norway. Most of the major Norwegian companies borrowed directly from foreign banks. This was especially true for the shipping industry, which often needed to borrow currencies and amounts beyond the capability of the Norwegian banks to provide.
The rise in oil prices after 1974 increased the Norwegian oil industry's need for loans to fund investments in the North Sea. Moreover, as oil companies found more and more oil in the North Sea and Norway's wealth increased, foreign banks became increasingly aggressive in approaching Norwegian firms.
The foreign banks sought to serve the firms' domestic business as well as their foreign business.
Norway was not alone among the Nordic countries in restricting the entry of foreign banks, nor was the Nordic hostility a recent development. Since at least 1920, Finland, Norway and Sweden had forbidden foreign banks to open branches (Wallenberg c.1920 ). Denmark's prohibition apparently came later. The hostility to foreign banks in the Nordic countries appears relatively anomalous among developed, market economies (Tschoegl 1985) . Though it persisted for decades, the policy of closure eventually collapsed. All three also limited foreign banks to at most small shareholdings in existing domestic banks (OECD 1984) .
In 1984 the Norwegian government substantially deregulated the domestic market. Norway finally allowed foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in Norway and Norwegian banks to establish branches abroad. A period of competitive turbulence followed.
Several existing domestic banks merged and investors created several new domestic banks. Seven foreign banks entered as soon as they could do so in 1985; ultimately the number of foreign banks in Norway peaked at nine (Table 1) . Ongena and Smith (1997a&b) provide some useful information on banks' relationships with companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) from 1979 to . Their data (1997a show that the proportion of firms reporting relationships with only one bank rose from 65% to over 75% in 1985. Foreign banks were hardest hit. In 1979 foreign banks accounted for 16% of all relationships with banks; by 1994 their share had dropped to 5%.
Bank deregulation led to a doubling of loans outstanding as banks pursued market share (Lindblom 1994) . This is consistent with Spiller and Favaro's (1984) results for deregulation in Uruguay that suggest that deregulation reduced oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms. For Portugal, Barros (1995) found that after deregulation incumbents reacted to each other but not to de novo entry. He also found that entrants grew faster.
By 1987, the banks' loan loss provisions had begun to rise markedly. (An additional factor beyond increased risk taking was the government's introduction of stricter accounting standards.) In the late 1980s, several smaller domestic banks did fail or underwent forced mergers. By 1990, the government agreed to permit foreign banks to acquire domestic banks.
Deregulation of the domestic market may have resulted in some efficiency gains. When Berg et al., (1992) examined productivity in Norwegian banks over the period 1980-1989, they found that productivity appeared to regress prior to deregulation and then grow rapidly after deregulation. The reduction in the range of productivity after deregulation appeared to have been the result of the larger banks reducing their deficiency vis-à-vis the smallest banks. Shaffer's (1994) cross-country study using data from 1979 to 1991, showed Norway to have a highly competitive banking system without excess capacity. Berg et al., (1993) also compared banking efficiency in Finland, Norway and Sweden in 1990; the average Norwegian bank was more efficient than the average Finnish bank but less efficient than the average Swedish bank. Earlier, Rinde (1986) too had found that Norwegian banks were not less efficient than those in other OECD countries though Swedish banks did seem slightly more efficient.
The studies by Rinde (1986) , Berg et al., (1992) , Berg et al., (1993) By the end of 1991, the government had come to own 100% of both CBK and Fokus Bank (now the third largest bank in Norway) and a majority share in DnB.
The government liquidated one smaller bank, Norion Bank, arranged some mergers and demanded wholesale restructuring of the banks it owned.
After the recapitalization, the banks recovered quickly. However, the Norwegian government still owns majority stakes in CBK, DnB and Fokus. In Monetary authorities, attempting to rein-in the credit expansion, ended the boom. Bartholomew (1994) reports that deflation of real estate values hit banking systems in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States.
Ball (1994) adds Australia, the UK and Japan to the list. Reflecting on the experience of the US and Japan, Kindleberger (1995) has an insightful paper on the difficulty that asset inflation poses for monetary policy.
In Norway the crisis peaked a year or so before the peak in the other Nordic countries (Koskenkylä 1994) . One possible reason that the crisis started earlier in Norway was that the fall in oil prices in 1986 hurt the Norwegian economy but helped most other major economies. Overall, loan losses were more severe in Norway than in Denmark and Finland but less severe than in Sweden. The reason that information is vague on so many of the early representative offices is that these representative offices were probably experiments that failed.
Banks established offices to see if the offices could generate business. When the offices did not, the parents quickly terminated the experiment.
The representative offices established in the early 1980s may have represented options on future liberalization (Kogut 1983) . Banks often establish representative offices as precursors to deeper entry (Ball & Tschoegl 1982 and Tschoegl 1982) . Choi et al., (1987) Of the seven foreign banks that Ongena and Smith (1997b) show as having relationships with OSE-listed companies in 1979 (Table 4a ), only Citibank (1 relationship) had a representative office. One could well argue that there was a negative correlation between having a representative office in Norway in 1979 and having relationships with OSE-listed companies (Table 4b ). Banks such as Chemical Bank (10 relationships in 1979) and Hambros (6 relationships in 1979) not only did not have a representative office in Oslo, they did not enter in 1985.
Representative offices may have represented an attempt by banks without relationships with top companies to establish a presence in the market nonetheless.
The first wave of foreign bank entrants (1985)
When the Norwegian government liberalized entry in 1985, seven foreign banks entered immediately (Table 5 ). These initial entrants came from the US (3), France (3) and the UK (1). However, of the world's largest or nearest banks, no Japanese, Scandinavian, German, Dutch, or Belgian banks entered. The UK bank that entered was a merchant bank and not one of the large commercial banks.
In the 11 years that have passed, four of the seven original entrants have left.
Four Swedish banks have entered or are entering and the first and third to enter have left. In total, between 1985 and 1996, eleven banks entered, of which five remain in 1996.
Timing and mode of entry show little variation. The alacrity with which the foreign banks entered suggests that several would have entered earlier, had the Norwegian government permitted it. The alacrity is also consistent with the evidence in Biswas et al., (1995) . They find that stock markets react favorably when banks enter markets where entry formerly was restricted, and unfavorably when the banks enter markets that formerly were open.
As far as mode of entry is concerned, one could expect that several of the entrants would have preferred to enter via a branch. Heinkel and Levi (1992) have an article that links the organizational form that foreign banks adopt in foreign markets to the product market the foreign banks are entering.
Norwegian government policy preempted any such choice. Grubel (1977) , in his pioneering article on the theory of multinational banking, distinguished three markets: wholesale, service and retail. Wholesale international banking involves operating in interbank markets such as foreign exchange and offshore currency. International service banking involves primarily services to corporations and other institutions. Key services include foreign exchange trading, commercial lending, international payments and the like. International retail banking involves providing deposit, payment and credit services to individuals residing in a country other than the bank's home.
The foreign banks that entered Norway aimed at international service banking. In the case of Norway, the US and French banks probably followed their home-country energy multinationals. In general, foreign banks follow the business of home country firms and seek the business of host country firms (Kindleberger 1983).
Wholesale banking activity was not an option. Oslo was not and is not an international finance center (Abraham et al. 1994; Scholtens 1992 brought with it 10 branches. Since then Handelsbanken has expanded its operation to 12 branches and some 60,000 customers (Euromoney 1995) . Svenska
Handelsbanken is particularly efficient in retail operations at home and has taken that advantage to Norway. It apparently can run a retail branch with a third fewer personnel than its competitors. Svenska Handelsbanken also established a subsidiary in Finland (1990;  converted to a branch in 1991) and a branch in Denmark (1992) .
The other foreign banks may have access to some ethnic retail banking opportunities (either expatriates or Swedes in Norway) but this would be a minor factor. The government also originally forbade the foreign banks to acquire local banks. Even so, absent ethnic or colonial ties foreign banks generally do not enter retail banking (Tschoegl 1987 ) and so the foreign banks' neglect of this sector in Norway is not surprising.
Theory suggests that increasing foreign market commitments will be linked to knowledge development. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) argue that, "...additional commitments will be made in small steps unless the firm has very large resources and/or market conditions are stable and homogenous, or the firm has much experience from other markets with similar conditions. If not, market experience will lead to a stepwise increase in the scale of operations and of the integration with the market environment ..."
This suggests that the banks with long-established representative offices would be particularly well-represented among the first entrants. Banks with extensive relationships with large Norwegian firms would have the knowledge to enter but might have less reason to do so. Table 6a suggests that there was some tendency for banks with relationships with Norwegian companies to establish subsidiaries, but the tendency was not strong. (Table 6b) in Norway. What I did do was to pick an arbitrary number, 100, for the missing data. If the true number was less than 100, the log odds would be smaller and the standard error larger, and if larger the log odds too would be larger and the standard error smaller. I return to this issue below.
The key questions in FDI in banking center on the issue of why do banks go abroad and how do they compete when they get there. Aliber (1976) asks why the production takes place abroad and why is it the foreign banks that provide it.
Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) ask what advantages do foreign firms possess that enable them to compete against the local firms that do not face the disadvantage of operating at a distance and in an unfamiliar market.
To investigate these questions I perform two OLS regressions with a dichotomous dependent variable. The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the bank in question established a subsidiary in Norway in 1985 and 0 otherwise. The OLS regression is equivalent to multivariate discriminant analysis. For a fuller treatment of dichotomous regressions in a similar context to the present see Ball and Tschoegl (1982) . For a critique of the general approach see P.N. O'Farrell et al., (1995) .
The population for the first regression is the twenty banks that Euromoney reported were the top foreign exchange (FX) dealers in the world in 1985 (Winder 1985) . The population for the second regression is drawn from The I also expect entry to be positively associated with Norway's imports from each bank's home country, and negatively with Norway's exports to the each bank's home country. Goldberg et al., (1989) find that international trade is intensive in its use of financial services and that financial services tend to be exported along with goods. Grosse and Goldberg (1991) and Goldberg and Johnson (1990) An additional theme that has emerged in the literature is strategic interaction between firms as a motive for foreign direct investment. The argument dates back at least to Knickerbocker (1973) and Graham (1978) and takes into account the roles of rivalry between and collusion among firms as factors in the foreign direct investment decision. The theoretical work in this area uses a game-theoretic perspective, modeling the interaction between firms as an open-ended, repeated game. Graham (1990) provides a model for an exchange of threat scenario. Veugelers (1995) 
offers a model that enables one to
analyze when strategic considerations may dominate and possibly counteract the effect of location and firm-specific motivations for FDI. Recent empirical work includes Yu and Ito (1988) , Terpstra and Yu (1989) , Ito and Rose (1994) and Hennart and Park (1994) . Engwal and Wallenstäl (1988) in one of the only works to focus on the issue of rivalrous behavior in banking find evidence for such behavior among Swedish banks in their international expansion.
To model competitive interaction I include two variables, SAME and SAME 2 .
For a given bank, SAME is the number of banks from the bank's home country with a subsidiary in Norway, not including the bank itself. I expect a positive coefficient for SAME and a negative coefficient for SAME 2 . These variables are not very satisfactory; they assume that for any bank the reference set is only other banks from its own country and all banks from its own country. Also I assume that each bank correctly anticipated what its compatriots would do while formulating its own decision.
To capture the role of prior experience in Norway, in both regressions I have Having a well-established representative office correlates positively and statistically significantly with the establishment of a subsidiary.
Lastly, the dummy variable for Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken is negative but not statistically significant. The variable also suggests that the legal and selfimposed restrictions were not binding. If I subtract the coefficient from the predicted value of Y for SEB (0.00), the resulting prediction (0.33) is still below 0.5. This suggests that SEB would not have established a subsidiary even it had been able to do so. In fact, SEB only established a branch in 1994, well after all constraints on its freedom had disappeared.
Neither model makes any prediction errors. If I take the predicted value of the dependent variable (entry as a subsidiary; yes = 1) and a cut-off point of 0.5, then each model correctly classifies all the banks in its group. Both models suggest that Barclays Bank of the UK was close to qualifying to establish a subsidiary, and both models suggest that Banque Paribas was close to not qualifying. Simonsen (1995) Table 7 suggest that membership may have been a non-binding restriction.
The delayed entry of the Swedes
Who did and did not survive
Twelve Even so, some ambiguity remains. Closure of the entity does not necessarily mean that the parent abandons all of the business. The foreign parent may continue to serve some of its clients from an operation in a nearby financial center such as London. Still, one can point out that withdrawl means the entrant was unable to develop sufficient business to require a continuing local presence.
As Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) found for their sample of firms, foreign banks in Norway were subject both to selection and evolutionary learning. Selection culled almost half the entrants. Among those that have survived to the present, several have improved their performance relative to incumbent firms. Those that made the most progress, however, did so by acquiring local firms rather than by simply growing more rapidly on the basis of internal factors.
My results are also consistent with some of Geroski's (1995) stylized facts and results about entry. For instance:
Stylized fact 4: The survival rate of most entrants is low and even successful entrants may take more than a decade to achieve a size comparable to the average incumbent.
Stylized result 8: Both firm size and age are correlated with the survival and growth of entrants.
The experience of the joint ventures
The US, UK and one French entrant entered with wholly-owned subsidiaries but two French banks entered via joint-ventures with local banks. The foreign parent of each joint venture eventually acquired complete control. The numbers are too small to permit us to say that entering as a joint venture increased the probability of survival.
We do not have the degrees of freedom necessary to take into account firms'
self-selection of their strategies (Shaver 1996) . Firms choose their entry mode to
give themselves the best chance of survival, given the firms' assessment of their own competitive advantages; if the probability of mistaken assessments and entry mode are uncorrelated, entry mode and survival should be uncorrelated.
Of the two original joint-ventures, one has survived to the present and one has not. Of the five wholly-owned subsidiaries, two have survived and three have not. I cannot reject the hypothesis that both proportions are the same but my failure to reject owes more to the small numbers than to the theory surviving a rigorous test.
Interestingly, the first foreign bank to withdraw was Banque Paribas.
Banque Paribas, unlike the other two French banks, had not established a joint venture. Banque Paribas also had not established a representative office before establishing its subsidiary and (partially in consequence) the models in Table 7 had classified it as a borderline entrant.
BNP and Indosuez both took on minority local partners at entry. BNP (75%) joined with Forretningsbanken (25%) and Indosuez (80%) joined with 
Experience and subsidiary or parent size matter
Three factors show some correlation with survival: prior experience as a representative office, size of the subsidiary at start-up and size of the parent. The most powerful explanatory factor is the prior experience. All three survivors had established representative offices in the 1970s and maintained them until
Norway liberalized entry; none of the banks that withdrew had established a representative office before entry. These results are consistent with those of Barkema et al., (1996) If we look at relationships per se, Ongena and Smith's (1997b) The foreign subsidiaries that survived also tended to be larger at start-up than the failures and to have larger parents. Table 8a gives assets in Norwegian Krone millions in 1985 for all seven subsidiaries and in US$ billions for the parents. Table 8b presents results for OLS regressions of a dichotomous dependent variable (survival: yes = 1 or no = 0) on the logarithm of the asset measures. None of the results are statistically significant at conventional levels.
However the coefficients have the sign one would expect.
It is not surprising that the size of the subsidiary should be a slightly stronger explanatory variable than the size of the parent bank. Both represent the resources that the venture can muster at start-up. Equivalently, size at start-up is indicative of customer relationships and relationships correlate positively with survival (Bergström et al. 1994) . However, the size of the subsidiary at start-up is a more concrete realization of those resources in the Norwegian context than is the size of the parent. When Svenska Nordbanken entered it was almost twice as large as Chase
Manhattan's subsidiary and almost as large as Citibank's. Svenska Nordbanken initially grew rapidly. Even so, the subsidiary closed. Table 9 gives the names, total assets, employees and branches for all 20
Conclusion
Norwegian commercial banks in 1994. Ten years after entry was liberalized, some foreign banks are prominent but owe this prominence to acquisition of domestic banks not to organic growth. Five of the eleven foreign banks that established subsidiaries withdrew. Even though foreign banks represent six out of the 20 commercial banks in Norway, the foreign banks' market share remains small.
Experience in Norway appears to matter, both to entry and to survival. That is, foreign banks with well-established representative offices in Norway were more likely than banks without such experience to establish subsidiaries when permitted to do so, and their subsidiaries were more likely to survive. Entry was associated with firm-level advantages, with market potential as measured by trade data, and with rivalrous behavior.
The number of firms is too small to test whether survival is independent of entry mode (joint venture vs. wholly-owned subsidiary). Overall, the evidence on entry and on joint ventures is consistent with Kogut's (1983) view of FDI as a sequential process based on the exercise or abandonment of options.
Finally, the foreign banks' market share is growing but may well be stabilizing at a low level. The foreign banks essentially provide a fringe service tied to import trade and related activities. Arguably large Log odds (for 'arguably large' = 100) = 2.3 with s.e. = 1.8 Table 6b There is an arguable association between a bank's having a long established representative office in Norway and its opening of a subsidiary there in 1985. 
